Introduction
Researchers on uncertain reasoning within the AI community have recently shown inter est in probabilistic reasoning using sets of standard probability assignments. For exam ple, Nilsson in [6] and Grosof in [3] have considered methods fo r reasoning with sets of probability assignments generated by probabilistic equality and inequality constraints1. Following Nilsson, I use the expression "Probabilistic Logic" to denote the collection of such methods. The aim of these methods is to compute a set of possible probabilities for a given statement from the specified set of probability assignments. If the set of proba bility assignments is generated by probabilistic equality and inequality constraints, the possible probabilities fo r a given statement fo rm an interval. Since Dempster-Shafer also associates an interval with each statement A, namely the interval bounded by Bel(A) and Pls(A), the question arises as to the connection between Dempster-Shafer belief fu nctions and sets of probability assignments defined by equality and inequality con straints. Grosof [3] has shown that the latter is a generalization of the fo rmer: every Dempster-Shafer belief fu nction is representable by a set of probability assignments aris ing fr om equality and inequality constraints, but not vice-versa. A related issue concerns the connection between Dempster's rule of combination and the combination of evidence statements in probabilistic logic. Grosof [2] states some results concerning conditions under which these two methods of combining evidence yield the same result. And where m is a mass function, the belief function Bel determined by m is given by:
B�A
When working within probabilistic logic, I follow Grosof in making explicit the evidence on which a mass function depends. Hence for each mass function m;, the statement m;(A) = p within Dempster-Shafer has as counterpart in probabilistic logic the state ment P(AlE;) = p, where P is a standard probability function and Ei is a statement representing the evidence on which m; is based.
The following is the most general theorem I know of that states conditions under which application of Dempster's rule agrees with combination of evidence in probabilistic logic:
Theorem 1 Let m11 m2 be mass functions over frame E> each with fo cal elements S t , ... ,sk I where the S; fo rm a partition ofE> (i.e., s i n S; = 0 fo r i ':/; j and sl u ... u sk = E> }; E1 and E2 propositions not defined in E>; e = {E t AE2, E1 A •E2, •E11\ •E2}; and r a set of probability assignments p over E) X e satisfying (i} P(Si} = 1/k, i = t, ... ,k. {By abuse of notation, I identify X � e with Xx£� E>x£.
(ii} P(E1 A EzlSi} = P{EtlSi}P{E2lSi ), i = t, ... ,k.
{iii} P(SilEt} = m1(S;) and P(SilE2) = m2(Si), i = t, ... ,k.
(iv) P(E11\ Ez} > 0.
Then, where Belt,2 is the belief function over e determined by ms = ml EB m2, fo r all A� E>, i E {1, ... , k}, andRE r:
(1) 
To prove equation (2) we construct a P E r such that P(AIE11\Ez) =min{ Q(AIE11\Ez : Q E r} and P(AIE1 1\ Ez) = Bel1,2(A). To do so we must distinguish between X � 0 and X X e � e X e. Let A � e. We wish to construct a probability fu nction p over e X e such that P(A X eiEl/\ E2) = min{Q(A X eiEl/\ E2) : Q E r}. The desired probability fu nction P will be determined if P( (} 1\ e) is defined for each 8 E 0, e E e. This will be accomplished if fo r each si, p is defined fo r every element of S; X e. Pick any R from r (if r is empty, the theorem is vacuously true). For each S.;, define P over the elements of Si X e as fo llows: if Si � A, set P( 8 1\e) = R( 81\ e) fo r each 8 1\e E Si X e; otherwise, choose a Oo E Si -A and set P( 80 1\ e) = R( Si 1\ e) and P ( 8 1\ e) = 0 for all e E si' e f. Oo. This fixes p fo r all singletons in e X e. By the construction of P, we have P(Si 1\ e)= R(Si 1\ e) and therefore since R satisfies (i)-(iv), so does P. Hence PEr. It is easy to verify that:
We now wish to show that P(A x eiE1 1\ Ez) = min{Q(A x eiE1 1\ Ez) : Q E r} = Belt,2(A). By probability theory, for any probability assignment Q in r,
, Ez) will be minimal if Q(A X eiSi 1\ El 1\ Ez) = 0 when si is not a subset of A. But P has this property, so
To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasize that the above theorem only states sufficient, not necessary, conditions fo r use of Dempster's rule to agree with combination of evidence in probabilistic logic. Thus it is quite possible for there to be cases in which the two methods of combination agree, but not all, and possibly none, of the above 2Yen in [7] is not directly concerned with probabilistic logic; however, his theorem 1 can be interpreted as applying to a class of probability functions and by adding the equivalent of my assumption (i) to Yen's assumptions, it is not hard to show that theorem 1 of the present paper fo llows.
sufficient conditions for agreement are satisfied. However, three points need to be made here: first,· as far as I know, no non-trivial necessary conditions for agreement have yet been stated (not even condition (ii), the independence condition, is necessary); second, if we think that probabilistic logic gives the right answer but wish to use Dempster's rule for computational convenience, then in order to be sure that a particular application of Dempster's rule gives the right answer, we need sufficient conditions for agreement, since the satisfaction of merely necessary conditions for agreement is no guarantee that there is agreement. Finally, what is in effect shown below is that the conditions of theorem 1 form a minimal set of sufficient conditions in the sense that if any one of them is removed then the theorem no longer holds.
3
How Much Disagreement?
The next question that arises is, How much divergence arises between Dempster-Shaler and probabilistic logic if one or more of the conditions of the theorem is not satisfied?
Obviously condition (iii ) on P must be kept and (iv) is necessary for the conditional probabilities to be defined. Thus the obvious candidates for scrutiny are conditions (i) and (ii). But other, less obvious, assumptions also enter into the theorem: for example, it is assumed that the focal elements of m1 and m2 are the same and that they constitute a partition of E>. This section shows that lifting any one of these assumptions can result in dramatic disagreement between Dempster-Shafer and probabilistic logic.
Let us begin by examining the effect of lifting the assumption that the members of the partition are equally probable. If (i) were abandoned, then the prior over the S, could swamp the effect of E1 and Ez. For example, given any fixed values for P ( SiiEt) and P( SiiE2), providing both these values are strictly between zero and one, P( SilE1 A Ez) can take on any value strictly between zero and one depending upon the value of P( Si)·
For simplicity consider the case of a bipartite partition of E> -i.e. there are only two members to the partition, call them H and H. Then if conditions (ii) and (iv) hold for P, the formula
can be proven. The factor O(H) in the second term of the denominator is the odds on H, defined to be P( H)j P( H). By making O(H) sufficiently high, the denominator can be made large, thus bringing P ( HIE1 A E2) close to zero, regardless of the values of P( HIE1 and P( HIE2) (providing neither is equal to one). However, if the sum of m1( H) and mz( H) is greater than one, m1 EJ3 mz ( H) will be greater than either mt( H) or mz( H). For example, with m1 ( H) = mz( H) = P( HIEt) = P( HIEz) = 0.9, but with P( H) = 0.999, we get m1 $ m2 ( H) � 0.99 but P( HIE1 A E2) = 0.075, a rather large difference indeed. Similarly, making O(H) small results in P( HIE1 A E2) being close to one.
The above example presents a counter-intuitive consequence of standard probability theory: the higher the prior probability of a hypothesis, the lower will be its posterior probability on the basis of the conjunction of two evidence statements that are condition ally independent under both the hypothesis and its negation. Though counterintuitive, this consequence can be made more plausible by considering the ratio P( HIE)/ P( H), of the posterior probability to the prior, and noting that the higher the prior, the smaller this ratio and so the less confirmatory the evidence is of the hypothesis. In particular, if P(H) is higher than P( HJE), then even if P( HJE) is high, E will be evidence against H and so the effect of combining two such evidence statements, when they are conditionally independent, is to even fu rther lower the posterior probability of H. Dempster's rule also diverges from probabilistic logic when the evidence statements are not conditionally independent under the members of the partition. It is well known that the combined effect of two non-independent evidence statements is not determined by their individual effects on the probability of a hypothesis (except when one of the posterior probabilities is zero or one). I will therefore say no more about the consequences of lifting condition (ii).
Of more interest is the question of what happens when the conditions on P are maintained, but the conditions fo r the mass function are changed. Recall that it was assumed that both mass fu nctions have the same fo cal elements and that these fo cal elements fo rm a partition of the frame of discernment. Consider the latter condition first. What if the fo cal elements do not fo rm a partition? In this case, the main difference is that under Dempster's rule, intersections of fo cal elements always obtain some mass in the combined mass distributions, but the same intersections do not always have a positive probability in the posterior on the basis of the both evidence statements. For example, suppose that 0 = {a, b, c } and m1 {a, b} = m2{ a, b} = ml{b, c} = m2{b, c} = 0.5. Then m3{b} = 0.5, but it is easy to construct a P satisfying (i)-(iv) such that P( bJE1AE2) = 0 -e.g., set P(b) = 0 and P(a) = P( c) = P( Ei) = P( E2) = P( aJEi) = P( cJE2) = 0.5.
I will present one final example in which Dempster's rule diverges from probabilistic logic, one that in my opinion shows a serious defect in Dempster's rule. In this example, the fo cal elements fo r each mass function form a partition but not the same partition. Let the frame of discernment e = {X 1, ••• ' Xn} and let the focal elements of ml be {X 1} and {x2, ••• , :z:n} and the fo cal elements of m2 the singleton elements of 0. Assume m2( {xi})= 1/n, i = 1, ... , n. Then m 1 ({x1})m2( { re 1}) + 2:: �=2 m1( { re 2, ... , :v n})m2( { :vi}) m1( {x1})1jn m1( {x1})l/n + {1 -ml{ re 1}) 2:: � 2 1/n m1( {:v1}) m 1({:v 1}) + (1 -m1( { re 1})) 2:: �=2 1 m1( {x1})
It can be seen that m3( {x1}) goes to zero as n goes to infinity, providing m1( {x1}) < 1. This is a disconcerting result. To see why, consider a concrete case in which the above mass fu nctions might be combined. Suppose there is a lottery with n individuals participating and only one winner. Let the frame of discernment be {x 1 , ••. , ren}, where Xi is the event of the it h participant (in some ordering of the participants) winning. It is known befo rehand what the winning number is. One piece of evidence is that Jones holds a ticket whose digits are identical with those of the winning number, except possibly fo r one digit (e.g, you see Jones' ticket except fo r one digit, which is obscured).
Another piece of evidence is that the lottery is fair: the participants get th�ir tickets through some random drawing process. In the Dempster-Shafer theory, the first piece of evidence, in the absence of the second, would plausibly be represented by a mass distribution of the form of m1-e.g. if :z:1 is the event of Jones' winning the lottery, then we might set m1( {:z:1}) = 0.1 if we see that Jones' ticket is identical with the winning ticket except possibly fo r one digit and, in the absence of knowledge as to whether or not the lottery is fai r, Dempster-Shafer would presumably recommend spreading the remaining mass over the set { :z:2, ... , :z: .. }, without assigning any mass to smaller subsets. And the second piece of evidence, in the absence of the first, would, I should think, be represented by m2 since we have positive evidence that each participant has an equal chance of winning.
·
With n = 112 and m1( :z: 1) = 0.1, we have which, being the total mass committed to {:z:1}, yields But this degree of belief seems much too low: if you believe that Jones' has at least a 1 in 10 chance of winning the lottery on the basis of seeing all but one digit of Jones' ticket, learning that the lottery is fair should not cause you to lower your degree of belief in Jones' winning. Worse still, since combination of evidence is commutative in Dempster-Shafer, imagine first learning that the lottery is fair, in which case you assign a 1 in 112 chance that Jones will win, and then learning that all but possibly one of the digits in Jones' ticket match those in the winning number. Surely it would be absurd to then lower Jones' chances of winning to 1 in 1000.
How would probabilistic logic handle the same example? Note that we cannot really keep the conditions on the probability assignment p in theorem 1 the same, since they refer to the Si, which are stipulated to be fo cal elements fo r both m1 and m2• However, we can assume that P(F!Et) = m1(F) fo r each fo cal element of m1 and similarly for m2• Also, condition (i) presents a bit of a problem since fo r k > 2, (i) cannot apply to both sets of fo cal elements. We assume instead that (i) applies to the singletons of e. In short, we assume that P satisfies the fo llowing conditions:
(1) P( {:z:i}) = 1/n,i = 1, ... ,n.
(2a) P( Et A E21{:z:i}) = P( Etl{:z:i})P( E2j{:z:i} ), i = 1, ... , n. Hence E2 has no effect on the probability of {a:1} in the presence of E1 (in fa ct, as required by the theorem of Johnson [4, p.199 ] fo r the case n > 2, Ez is jrrelevant to any a:i)· Hence no matter how large n is, the probability of Jones' winning given both E1 and E2 will be 0. 1. This seems a much more reasonable result.
An objection to the above comparison of Dempster-Shafer with probabilistic logic was raised by one of the reviewers of this paper. According to this objeCtion, there is nothing surprising in the fa ct that the combination of the evidence about Jones' ticket and the evidence about the fa irness of the lottery lowers Jones' probability of winning. After all, both pieces of evidence state that it is highly unlikely that Jories will win, so why shouldn't their combination make it even more unlikely that he will win?
This objection confuses a hypothesis's being unlikely on the basis of certain evidence with its being disconfirmed by that evidence. A piece of evidence disconfirms a given hypothesis if the probability of that hypothesis on the basis of that piece of evidence is lower than the prior probability of the hypothesis. If two independent pieces of information disconfirm a hypothesis, then their conjunction should indeed disconfirm the same hypothesis to an even greater degree. However, in the above example, the evidence about Jones' ticket does not disconfirm the hypothesis that he will win. To the contrary, given the assumed size of the hypothesis space, it significantly increases Jones' probability of winning. Furthermore, the example can modified so that the evidence about Jones' ticket makes it highly probable that he will win: assume that you see all the digits in Jones' ticket and are ninety percent certain that Jones holds the winning ticket (you may be slightly unsure about one of the digits in the winning ticket). Then if the only modification to the example is that ml({:z:t}) = 0.9, we find that Belt,z({a:l}) is 0.075, still much too low a number, while P( {a:1}/E1 1\ Ez) = 0.9.
The source of the discrepancy between Dempster's rule and probabilistic logic in this case can be discovered by rewriting the equations fo r m3({a:1}) and P( {a: l } / E1 /\E2) as follows: m3({a:1}) mt({a:l}) (8) ml({a:t}) + T1 n T1 L m1( {a:z, ... ,a: .. }) (9) i=Z P( {a: t } / Et 1\ E z) P( {:z: t } / E l) (10) P( { X t }/E l) + T2 n Tz L P({a:i}/ E l) (11) i=Z The difference is in the terms T1 and T2• The difference is that m1 ( { a:2, •.. ,a: .. } is a con stant, whereas P( { a:i}/E1), i = 2, ... , n grows, on average, smaller as n increases since the term Tz is equal toP( {a:2 .•• , x .. } / E1), which is stipulated to be equal to m2( {xz, ... ,a:,.}), a constant. Hence T1 goes to infinity as n goes to infinity, but T2 remains constant.
Conclusion
I have proven that Dempster's rule of combination agrees with combination of evidence in probabilistic logic under certain conditions. I have also shown that these two methods for combining evidence can produce radically different results when these conditions do not obtain. Of particular interest is the fact that even when the conditional independence assumptions are satisfied, differences can result when the focal elements of the two mass functions do not form a partition or form different partitions.
